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ABSTRACT 
 
The NEDIES project is being conducted at Ispra by the Institute for 
the Protection and Security of the Citizen (IPSC) of the EC 
Directorate General Joint Research Centre (JRC). The objective of 
the project is to support the Commission Services of the European 
Communities, Member State Authorities and EU organisations in 
their efforts to prevent and prepare for natural disasters and 
accidents, and to manage their consequences. 
 
A main NEDIES activity is to produce lessons learnt report on 
natural disasters and accidents. This report discusses lessons learnt 
from maritime disasters. It is based on the contributions submitted 
by some EU Civil Protection Authorities to the NEDIES Team and 
also information collected from literature and the Internet. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
There is no doubt that a significant number of the world’s population has heard of the most 
famous maritime disaster: Titanic and its collision with an iceberg. Many lessons have been 
learnt since this historical event, which triggered the ratification of the most important 
international treaty concerning the safety of merchant ships: the SOLAS (Safety of Life At 
Sea) Convention in 19141. Maritime disasters are relatively common events and do not often 
get the attention required. This report aims to portray the lessons learnt from some maritime 
disasters that occurred in Europe in a user-friendly manner, targeting Civil Protection 
authorities and the general public, so as to raise awareness on maritime disaster management 
issues. 
During the collection of information on lessons learnt from recent maritime disasters across 
Europe, it is important to highlight the difficulties encountered during this endeavour. They 
are mainly due to the ongoing judicial investigations linked to such accidents regarding the 
possible existence of civil and criminal liabilities, with court cases lasting up to several years. 
Furthermore, in order to avoid misunderstandings and confusion whilst reading this 
document, it is essential to note that in this report, maritime disaster implies shipping 
disasters. Disasters such as oil spills are sometimes also regarded as a maritime disaster. 
However, in this report they are regarded as a possible effect of a maritime disaster. 
This document is based on the contributions from experts in the field of maritime disasters. 
Chapter 2 is dedicated to the lessons learnt from various maritime disasters experienced 
throughout Europe. The first maritime disaster entry described is the capsizing of the ro-ro 
passenger vessel MV Estonia, derived from the final report of the Joint Accident 
Investigation Commission of Estonia, Finland and Sweden (Section 2.1). This is followed by 
the description of the fire aboard the passenger ferry Prinsesse Ragnhild, which is a 
contribution from Norway and Sweden (Section 2.2). The third event described is on the 
cargo ship Ulsund - LHNW, derived from the Joint Norwegian/Finnish Casualty report 
(Section 2.3). The last contribution portrays the disaster bearing upon the two Baltic herring 
trawlers Lea and Nipsu (Section 2.4). 
Chapter 3 summarises the various lessons learnt contributions. It also offers some 
conclusions arising from the analysis of the contributions. 
An Annex is also provided, which offers a suggestion of maritime disaster causes, along with 
a list of useful links pertaining maritime disasters. 
This endeavour has been carried out  within the framework of the NEDIES Project. NEDIES 
(Natural and Environmental Disaster Information Exchange System) is concerned with 
natural disasters and accidents, which occurred in EU Member States. It is carried out at the 
Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen (IPSC), DG Joint Research Centre of 
the European Commission. This lessons learnt report was made for the Civil Protection 
Services of the EU Member States and organisations, people involved in the management of 
any type of natural disaster and accidents and also the general public. Although the lessons 
learnt from maritime disasters are addressed in the report, many of them could also be of 
help in the prevention of, preparedness for and response to other types of disasters. 
                                                 
1 SOLAS Convention has been amended continuously in response to lessons learnt from other maritime 
disasters. Due to a complete change in the amending procedure of the treaty in 1974, in response to 
demands in the field, the Convention is commonly referred to as SOLAS, 1974, as amended. 
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2. LESSONS LEARNT 
 
2.1 MV Estonia Disaster (Estonia) 
Joint Estonian/Finnish/Swedish Accident Investigation Commission2 (Estonia, Finland, 
Sweden) 
 
2.1.1 Date of the disaster and location 
28 September 1994, en-route between Tallin and Stockholm, in the middle of the Baltic 
Sea. 
 
2.1.2 Description of the event3 
The Estonian-flagged ro-ro passenger ferry ESTONIA (Figure 2.1.a) departed from Tallinn, 
the capital of Estonia, on 27 September 1994 at 19.15 hrs for a scheduled voyage to 
Stockholm, the capital of Sweden (Figure 2.1.b). The ship carried 989 people, 803 of whom 
were passengers.  
 
Figure 2.1.a - The ro-ro passenger ferry ESTONIA. 
© Accident Investigation Board Finland 
The ship left harbour with all four main engines running. When she was clear of the harbour 
area full service speed was set. The engine setting was maintained up to the accident. The 
wind was southerly, 8-10 m/s. Visibility was good, with rain showers. At 20.00 hrs the watch 
on the bridge was taken by one of the two second officers and the third officer.  
 
                                                 
2The Joint Accident Investigation Commission consistes of the following: 
For Estonia: Uno Laur (Chairman), Heino Jaakula, Jaan Metsaveer, Ministry of Transport and 
Communications 
For Finland: Kari Lehtola, Heimo Iivonen, Tuomo Karppinen, Accident Investigation Board 
For Sweden: Ann-Louise Eksborg, Hans Rosengren, Olle Noord, Board of Accident Investigation 
3 From http://www.onnettomuustutkinta.fi/estonia/chapt01.html 
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Figure 2.1.b - Route of the MV Estonia. 
© Accident Investigation Board Finland 
 
The voyage proceeded normally. Sea conditions along the Estonian coast were moderate, but 
became more rough when the ship left the sheltered waters. The ship had a slight starboard 
list due to a combination of athwartships weight disposition, cargo disposition and wind 
pressure on the port side. 
As the voyage continued the wind velocity increased gradually and the wind veered to south-
west. Visibility was generally more than 10 nautical miles. At midnight the wind was south-
westerly 15-20 m/s with a significant wave height of 3-4 m. The rolling and pitching of the 
vessel increased gradually, and some passengers became seasick.  
At about 00.25 hrs the ESTONIA reached a waypoint at position N 59.20 and E 22.00, and 
from there headed true course 287°. The speed was about 14 knots and the vessel 
encountered the seas on her port bow. Due to increasing rolling, the fin stabilisers were 
extended.  
During his scheduled round on the car deck, the seaman of the watch heard shortly before 
01.00 hrs a metallic bang from the bow area as the vessel hit a heavy wave. The seaman of 
the watch informed the second officer about what he had heard and was ordered to try to find 
out what had caused the bang. The seaman did so by waiting at the ramp, listening and 
checking the indicator lamps for the visor and ramp locking devices. He reported that 
everything seemed to be normal.  
At 01.00 hrs the watch on the bridge was taken over by a second officer and a fourth officer. 
After being relieved, one of the second officers and the third officer left the bridge. Further 
observations of unusual noise, starting at about 01.05 hrs, were made during the following 10 
minutes by many passengers and some crew members who were off duty in their cabins. 
When the seaman of the watch returned from his round, soon after the change of watches, he 
caught up the master and entered the bridge just behind him. Shortly afterwards he was sent 
down to the car deck to find out the cause of the sounds reported by telephone to the bridge. 
He did not, however, manage to reach the car deck.  
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At about 01.15 hrs the visor separated from the bow and tilted over the stem. The ramp was 
pulled fully open, allowing large amounts of water to enter the car deck. Very rapidly the 
ship took on a heavy starboard list. She was turned to port and slowed down. Passengers 
started to rush up the staircases and panic developed at many places. Many passengers were 
trapped in their cabins and had no chance of getting out in time. Lifejackets were distributed 
to those passengers who managed to reach the boat deck. They jumped or were washed into 
the sea. Some managed to climb into liferafts which had been released from the vessel. No 
lifeboats could be launched due to the heavy list.  
At about 01.20 hrs a weak female voice called “Häire, häire, laeval on häire” the Estonian 
words for “Alarm, alarm, there is alarm on the ship”, over the public address system. Just a 
moment later an internal alarm for the crew was transmitted over the public address system. 
Soon after this the general lifeboat alarm was given. A first Mayday call from the ESTONIA 
was received at 01.22 hrs. A second Mayday call was transmitted shortly afterwards and by 
01.24 hrs 14 ship- and shore-based radio stations, including the Maritime Rescue Co-
ordination Centre (MRCC) in Turku, had received the Mayday calls.  
At about this time all four main engines had stopped. The main generators stopped 
somewhat later and the emergency generator started automatically, supplying power to 
essential equipment and to limited lights in public areas and on deck. The ship was now 
drifting, lying across the seas. The list to starboard increased and water had started to enter 
the accommodation decks. Flooding of the accommodation continued with considerable 
speed and the starboard side of the ship was submerged at about 01.30 hrs. During the final 
stage of flooding the list was more than 90 degrees. The ship sank rapidly, stern first, and 
disappeared from the radar screens of ships in the area at about 0150 hrs. See Figure 2.1.c for 
the computer-generated pictures illustrating the development of the list and sinking of the 
vessel. 
Rescue efforts were initiated by MRCC Turku. About one hour after the ESTONIA had 
sunk, four passenger ferries in the vicinity arrived on the scene of the accident. Rescue 
helicopters were summoned and the first one arrived at 0305 hrs. The wreck was found in 
international waters within Finland's Search and Rescue Region, resting on the seabed at a 
water depth of about 80 m with a heading of 95° and a starboard list of about 120°. The visor 
was missing and the ramp partly open. The position of the wreck is N 59.23 and E 21.41. 
The visor, which has been recovered, was located at N 59.23 and E 21.39, about one nautical 
mile west of the wreck. 
 
2.1.3 Human consequences4  
During the night and early morning, helicopters and assisting ships rescued 138 people, of 
whom one later died in hospital. During the day and on the two following days 92 bodies 
were recovered. Most of the missing persons accompanied the vessel to the seabed. 
Out of the 989 people on board the ship, a total of 852 persons lost their lives in the accident. 
Of them one died in hospital and 92 were found in the water and in liferafts during the 
rescue operation and the following days. No victims were found on the seabed surrounding 
the wreck or on the external areas of the wreck during the diving survey. Two bodies have 
subsequently been found in the area of the Gulf of Finland, one in the open sea and one on 
the shorelines of Estonia. There are still 757 persons missing. 
                                                 
4 From http://www.onnettomuustutkinta.fi/estonia/chapt01.html and 
http://www.onnettomuustutkinta.fi/estonia/chapt08_6.html#3 
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The survey of the interior was only partial and essentially limited to public areas and cabins 
along the port side of the wreck. About 130 victims, including those on the bridge, were 
observed in different areas. Many victims in various localities had lifejackets on. 
Of the approximately 300 people who reached the open decks, some 160 succeeded in 
climbing onto liferafts, and a few climbed onto capsized lifeboats. Helicopters rescued 104 
people, and vessels rescued 34. 
 
2.1.4 Economic losses 
Not available. 
 
2.1.5 Prevention measures and related lessons learnt5 
þ At the time of the ESTONIA's construction (1980), despite scattered information, the 
industry's general experience of hydrodynamic loads on large ship structures was 
limited, and the design procedures for bow doors were not well-established, thus 
leading to the following failures. 
- The locking devices and the hinges of the bow visor failed fully under one or two 
wave impact loads on the visor shortly after 01.00 hrs, due to wave-induced 
impact loads creating opening moments about the deck hinges. 
- The visor attachments were not designed according to realistic design 
assumptions, including the design load level, load distribution to the attachments 
and the failure mode. The attachments were constructed with less strength than the 
simplistic calculations required. It is believed that this discrepancy was due to lack 
of sufficiently detailed manufacturing and installation instructions for certain parts 
of the devices. 
- There were no detailed design requirements for bow visors in the rules of Bureau 
Veritas, the classification society concerned, at the time of the building of the 
ESTONIA. 
- The visor design load and the assumed load distribution on the attachments did not 
take realistic wave impact loads into account. 
- The bow visor locking devices should have been several times stronger to have a 
reasonable level of safety for the regular traffic between Tallinn and Stockholm. 
- The visor locking devices were not examined for approval by the Finnish 
Maritime Administration, nor by Bureau Veritas. 
- The visor locking devices installed were not manufactured in accordance with the 
design intentions. 
- No safety margin was incorporated in the total load-carrying capacity of the visor 
attachment system.  
- The attachment system as installed was able to withstand a resultant wave force 
only slightly above the design load used.  
- Wave impact loads generated on the night of the accident exceeded the combined 
strength of the visor attachments.  
- Wave impact loads on the visor increased very quickly with increasing significant 
wave height, while forward speed had a smaller effect on the loads. 
                                                 
5 From http://www.onnettomuustutkinta.fi/estonia/chapt20.html, 
http://www.onnettomuustutkinta.fi/estonia/chapt21.html  and 
http://www.onnettomuustutkinta.fi/estonia/chapt22.html 
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- The visor indicator lamps on the bridge did not show when the visor was detached, 
and the visor was not visible from the conning position. Nor did the lamps show 
when the ramp was forced open. 
- Information on bow visor incidents was not systematically collected, analysed and 
spread within the shipping industry. Thus masters on board had, in general, very 
little knowledge of the potential danger of the bow visor closure concept. 
 
 
Figure 2.1.c - Computer-generated pictures illustrating the development of the list and sinking of the vessel. 
© Accident Investigation Board Finland  
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þ The ESTONIA capsized due to large amounts of water entering the car deck, loss of 
stability and subsequent flooding of the accommodation decks. 
- Large amounts of water entered the car deck and in a few minutes a starboard list 
of more than 15° developed. 
- The full-width open car deck contributed to the rapid increase in the list. The turn 
to port - exposing first the open bow and later the listed side to the waves - 
shortened the time until the first windows and doors broke, which led to 
progressive flooding and sinking. 
- The entry of water at the sides of the partly open bow ramp was observed on a 
monitor in the engine control room, but no information was exchanged with the 
bridge. 
þ The Finnish Maritime Administration was, according to a national decree, exempt 
from doing hull surveys of vessels holding valid class certificates issued by authorised 
classification societies. 
þ The SOLAS6 requirements for an upper extension of the collision bulkhead were not 
satisfied. This non-compliance may have contributed to the vessel's capsizing. 
 
2.1.6 Preparedness measures and related lessons learnt3 
þ The crew should have been better prepared for this event, as they would have been 
able to react more efficiently. This can clearly be deduced from the Estonia report: 
- The initial action by the officers on the bridge indicates that they did not realise 
that the bow was fully open when the list started to develop. 
- The bridge officers did not reduce speed after receiving two reports of metallic 
sounds and ordering an investigation of the bow area. A rapid decrease in speed at 
this time would have significantly increased the chances of survival. 
- The visor could not be seen from the conning position, which the Commission 
considers a significant contributing factor to the capsizing of the ship. In all 
incidents known to the Commission where the visor had been opened at sea due to 
locking device failure, the opening was observed visually from the bridge and the 
officers of the watch were able quickly to take appropriate action. 
- There are indications that the crew did not use all means to seek or exchange 
information regarding the occurrence at a stage when it would still have been 
possible to influence the development of the accident. The bridge crew apparently 
did not look at the TV monitor which would have shown them that water was 
entering the car deck; nor did they ask those in the control room from where the 
ingress was observed, or get information from them. 
- The position sensors for signal lamps showing locked visor were connected to the 
side locking bolts in such a way that the lamp on the bridge showed locked visor 
even after the visor had tumbled into the sea. The indirect information on the status 
of the visor was thus misleading. The signal lamp for locked ramp was most likely 
not on because one of the locking bolts was not fully extended. There was thus no 
lamp warning when the visor had forced the ramp partly open and it was resting 
inside the visor. 
                                                 
6 SOLAS is the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (1974). See 
http://www.imo.org/Conventions/contents.asp?topic_id=257&doc_id=647 for more information. 
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- It is most likely that the crew were unaware of visor incidents involving other 
vessels. 
þ A better evacuation manouvre should have been carried out. This can also be deduced 
from the Estonia report, as portrayed below: 
- There was no organised evacuation. 
- The time available for evacuation was very short, between 10 and 20 minutes. 
- The lifesaving equipment in many cases did not function as intended. Lifeboats 
could not be lowered. 
- The lifeboat alarm was not given until about five minutes after the list developed, 
nor was any information given to the passengers over the public address system. 
By the time the alarm was given, the list made escaping from inside the vessel 
very difficult. This together with problems in using lifesaving equipment 
contributed to the tragic outcome. The rapid increase in the list contributed to the 
large loss of life. 
- The distress traffic was not conducted in accordance with the procedures required 
by the radio regulations. 
- The evacuation was hampered by the rapid increase in the list, by narrow passages, 
by transverse staircases, by objects coming loose and by crowding. About 300 
people reached the outer decks. Most victims remained trapped inside the vessel. 
 
2.1.7 Response actions and related lessons learnt3 
þ The coordination of the response operations should be improved, as it is necessary to 
respond timely to the disaster. However, due to the following incidents, this was not 
achieved during this event. 
- Initially the accident was not treated as a major accident. It was formally 
designated as such at 02.30. 
- The alarming of helicopters was late. MRCC Turku started alerting rescue units at 
01.26 hrs (approximately 1 hour after the alarm). One standby helicopter was 
alerted at 01.35 hrs (1hour and 10 minutes after the alarm), another at 02.18 hrs 
(almost 2 hours after the alarm), and the military helicopters at 02.52 hrs (2 hours 
and 30 minutes after the alarm). The assistance by Swedish helicopters was agreed 
at 01.58 hrs (approximately 1 hour and a half after the alarm). 
- The master of the SILJA EUROPA was appointed OSC (On-Scene Commander) 
at 02.05 hrs. 
- The first rescue unit, the MARIELLA, arrived on the scene of the accident at 
02.12 hrs, 50 minutes after the first distress call. 
- MRCC Tallinn was informed of the accident at 02.55 hrs by MRCC Helsinki. 
- The first helicopter arrived at 03.05 hrs. 
- An air co-ordinator arrived to assist the OSC at 06.50 hrs and a surface search co-
ordinator arrived at 09.45 hrs. 
- The participating vessels did not launch lifeboats or MOB7 boats due to the heavy 
weather. Their rescue equipment was not suitable for picking up people from the 
water or from rafts. 
                                                 
7 Man Overboard (MOB). 
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þ The helicopters had a key part in the rescue operation by rescuing most of the people 
who had succeeded in climbing onto liferafts or lifeboats. However they should be 
better organised because: 
- Winch problems in three Swedish Navy helicopters seriously limited their rescue 
capacity. 
- One rescue man per helicopter was not enough due to the very exhausting rescue 
work. 
- Some helicopters carried journalists during the later rescue flights. It is deemed 
inappropriate for helicopters to carry journalists in critical situations and where 
they may encroach on the privacy of survivors. 
- The main reasons for the delay in issuing alarms in general were that the distress 
traffic was conducted separately from MRCC Turku, and that there was only one 
person on duty at MRCC Turku, at MRCC Helsinki and at Helsinki Radio, 
respectively. 
þ In the Finnish MRCCs the instructions regarding distress traffic were inadequate, and 
thus should be improved.  
þ The lifesaving equipment of vessels participating in the rescue operation proved 
unsuitable for rescuing people from the water in the prevailing heavy weather 
conditions. 
 
2.1.8 Information supplied to the public and related lessons learnt3 
The public should be better informed about what to do in the event of an accident, so as to 
assist them in being better prepared: 
þ The first known Mayday call from the ESTONIA was transmitted at 01.22 hrs, and at 
about the same time the lifeboat alarm was given. Shortly before that, a brief alarm in 
Estonian was given over the public address system. Just after this, the crew was 
alerted by a coded fire alarm. No general information was given to the passengers 
during the accident.  
þ The lifeboat alarm was not given until about five minutes after the list developed, nor 
was any information given to the passengers over the public address system.  
 
 
2.2 Fire in the engine room aboard the passenger ferry “Prinsesse 
Ragnhild” (Norway, Sweden) 
Berit Svensen (Directorate for Fire and Explosion Prevention) and Ulf Hallström (Search 
and Rescue Service) 
 
2.2.1 Date of the disaster and location  
8 July 1999, in the engine room of the passenger ferry “Prinsesse Ragnhild” (PR). The vessel 
was situated outside Gothenburg in Swedish waters. 
 
2.2.2 Description of the event 
PR sails between Kiel and Oslo. The fire on board was first discovered at approximately 
01.55 hours when the alarm sounded and the engineer on duty entered the engine room and 
ascertained flames by the cylinder on the inside of the starboard main engine.  
 10
The course of events on board the vessel according to the inquiry is, in short, as follows 
(Table 2.1): 
Table 2.1 – Course of events on the Prinsesse Ragnhild 
Time (hrs) Brief description 
01.55 Fire in engine room reported 
02.14 Mayday. Emergency call on VHF 16. Response from Farsund Radio in 
Norway immediately followed by response from Sweden Rescue, MRCC- 
Gothenburg in Sweden. 
02.20 Preparation of lifeboats, rafts etc. 
02.40 Decision made to apply CO2 system. System malfunctions. 
02.46 Decision made to evacuate passengers. 
02.54 Signal to passengers to muster at assembly stations. 
02.59 Evacuation of passengers commences. 
03.25 CO2  system is now functioning. 
04.15 Fire is under control. 
04.15 All evacuated apart from 6 passengers and the crew. 
05.17 Fire is extinguished. 
 
At 02.13 hrs, according to the SAR8-log and at 02.14 hrs, according to the Maritime Enquiry 
- the Captain is informed of the situation and a mayday distress message is transmitted on 
VHF channel 16. The Mayday is first answered by Farsund Radio in Norway and shortly 
after, as soon as there is a chance to break in to the radio traffic, Sweden Rescue i.e. 
Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre (MRCC) Gothenburg responds to the Mayday and 
takes charge of the SAR-mission as the incident has occurred within the Swedish SAR 
region. The position is given as N 57.39 and E 11.19. 
The decision to evacuate was made due to the strong development of heat and problems in 
extinguishing the fire. The captain requested assistance from land.  
The weather conditions during the entire SAR-mission was very favourable with good 
visibility. The air temperature was approximately + 18 degrees Celsius. 
The Sar Mission Co-ordinator (SMC) judged the situation “Critical” and classed the case as 
“Distress”. 
The SMC made his General Decision (GD) at 02.15 hrs, which according to the SAR-log 
read: “Relay distress message. Let MRSC (Maritime Rescue Sub Centre) receive and 
organise response – acknowledgements from merchant vessels in the area on VHF channel 
67. Alert all available SAR air- and surface-units.” 
At 02.16 hrs MRCC requested the assistance from Aeronautical Rescue Co-ordination 
Centre (ARCC) Sweden. At 02.17 hrs SSRS (Swedish Life-boat Association) stations in 
Käringön, Rörö and Hovås were alerted via selective-calls on VHF, and the mayday 
message was relayed according to the previously mentioned GD. 
At the same time RCC Stavanger (Norway) offer their assistance as “supporting RCC” to 
MRCC Sweden. 
At 02.20 hrs a Support-Group is called in to MRCC Sweden according to an alert list. 
At 02.23 hrs off-duty MRCC staff-members are called in. 
                                                 
8 SAR stands for Search And Rescue. 
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MRSC Stockholm is given the task of co-ordinating the merchant vessels responding to the 
distress alert. 
SOK (Sörvärnets Operativa Kommando – the Danish MRCC) inform the MRCC at 02.19 
hrs that they intend to send 4 surface rescue-units to the area. At the same time the SSRS 
vessels PO Hansson and Märta Collin report that they are now leaving port for the area. 
Shortly afterwards the SSRS vessel Ulla Rinman reports similarly. These units arrive at the 
m/s Prinsesse Ragnhild at 03.05 hrs according to the SAR-log. 
Initially ARCC Sweden alerts the Säve Helicopter Base (Gothenburg) and one medical team 
on their minicall at 02.25 hrs. 
At 02.29 hrs a FRT (Fire Response Team) from the Gothenburg Fire Brigade is alerted and 
leaves for Säve Helicopter Base for further transport to the m/s Prinsesse Ragnhild. 
At 02.47 hrs the helicopter bases in Ronneby (Southeast Coast of Sweden) and Berga 
(Stockholm), as well as the Fire Response Teams in Stockholm and Helsingborg are alerted. 
At 02.36 hrs clearance was given verbally for 3 Norwegian helicopters to enter Swedish 
territory and assist in accordance with the Swedish permission regulations. 
At 02.45 hrs RCC Stavanger alerted, on request from MRCC Sweden, a Fire Response 
Team in Larvik to be transported to the scene in a Norwegian helicopter at 03.40 hrs. 
At 02.50 hrs Swedish Coastguard vessel # 288 arrives as first vessel on the scene to the m/s 
Prinsesse Ragnhild, followed shortly after by the faster of the SSRS vessels. Additional 
vessels from SSRS, the Swedish Maritime Administration, the Swedish Coastguard and the 
Swedish Defence Force followed. 
11 merchant vessels including 5 passenger-ferries offer their assistance in the SAR mission. 
The main task for the smaller surface units in the SAR mission consisted of towing 
approximately 50 liferafts and lifeboats with evacuated passengers from ms Prinsesse 
Ragnhild to other merchant vessels where the passengers were taken care of. 
The ms (motor ship) Stena Danica took 614 passengers, ms Kihlstraum 155, ms Black 
Watch 364 and the fishing vessel Matilda 25 passengers, making a total of 1.158. 
The evacuated passengers that were taken care of onboard the above mentioned vessels, 
except Matilda, were later transferred to Älvsnabben no. 4 and Älvsnabben no. 5, two 
smaller passenger ferries servicing the Gothenburg archipelago and owned by the Styrsö 
Ferryboat Company (Styrsöbolaget), as well as certain other smaller vessels for further 
transport to the NCW (Naval Command West – a military camp) which served as assembly 
point for the evacuated passengers. The fishing vessel Matilda also took its passengers to 
Tångudden in the NCW grounds. 
Helicopters also participated to a certain extent in the transportation of passengers from ms 
Stena Danica to the assembly point. This was later criticised seeing as these passengers were 
already safe onboard Stena Danica. 
3 passengers were flown by helicopter directly to hospital. 
At 04.15 hrs, two hours after the initial distress call and one hour sixteen minutes after the 
evacuation started, ms Prinsesse Ragnhild announced that all passengers except 4 (later to be 
corrected to 6) and the crew had been evacuated. They also informed that the fire now had 
been extinguished. 
The favourable weather conditions as well as professional conduct of all ships crews 
involved contributed greatly to the successful evacuation of the passengers from the ms 
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Prinsesse Ragnhild, the relatively smooth transportation of these to the participating 
merchant vessels and the successful gathering of the liferafts. Given different conditions at 
another time of year, with strong winds and rough seas, the operation would have had great 
difficulties to succeed if the Captain had made the same decision to evacuate in the same 
way. 
In the Maritime Enquiry at the Gothenburg District Court the Captain was asked if he would 
have decided to evacuate his ship in the same manner under worse weather conditions i.e. 
colder temperature, stronger winds and rougher sea. 
The Captain replied that under the same circumstances, with the information he held that the 
fire was worsening and that the heat was spreading in the vessel, along with his knowledge 
of the resistance times of the isolation material used onboard, he would have made the same 
decision to evacuate, even under more severe weather conditions. 
At 06.04 hrs a tug was made fast to the ms Prinsesse Ragnhild with the intention to tow her 
to Fredrikshamn in Denmark. This destination was later changed to Gothenburg, as a result 
of discussions between Ship-Inspectors and the Port of Gothenburg. 
At 06.16 hrs the Ship-Inspectors informed that it had been double-checked that there were no 
remaining passengers onboard and that the situation was under control. 
At 07.47 hrs the tugs Per and Lars are made fast and start towing ms Prinsesse Ragnhild to 
Gothenburg Port. 
At 12.55 hrs ms Prinsesse Ragnhild is alongside berth number 601. 
During the evacuation Fire Response Teams from Gothenburg, Helsingborg and Stockholm 
were alerted at first, and somewhat later even from Norway (Larvik) and Denmark 
(Fredrikshamn). 
Difficulties arose in putting the Fire Response Teams directly onboard the PR, and it was 
therefore decided to drop them of on other suitable vessels for further transportation with 
smaller units. 
The first Fire Response Team on the scene came from Frölunda fire-station in Gothenburg 
and were flown out by helicopter to the ms Stena Danica and from there transported with a 
smaller vessel to the PR. Certain difficulties were encountered in boarding the PR. 
At 04.50 hrs the first Fire Response Team from Frölunda were onboard the PR, 35 minutes 
after that the PR had announced that there were no longer any passengers left onboard, 
except for a few truck drivers that stayed onboard at their own choice. 
Shortly afterwards Fire Response Teams from the Kortedala fire-station in Gothenburg, from 
Larvik in Norway and from Fredrikshamn in Denmark boarded.  
Seeing that the PR had no “Helicopter Landing Area” these teams were all transported via 
other passenger ferries (Stena Danica and Queen of Scandinavia) with smaller units to the 
PR, at a certain time-loss. It was decided not to use the “Helicopter pick up area” available 
on the PR. This decision was later changed. 
At 06.09 hrs it was informed that there were four Fire Response Teams onboard - one 
Danish, one Norwegian and two Swedish. 
The Fire Response Team from Helsingborg, Sweden was transported by helicopter to Säve 
Helicopter Base where they arrived at 05.35 hrs, or shortly thereafter. 
They then waited there together with a Fire Response Team from Stockholm as backup until 
08.30 hrs when they were flown out to release the two Swedish teams and the Danish team.  
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The Fire Response Team from Stockholm was alerted at 02.45 hrs and left for Berga 
Helicopter Base for further transport by helicopter to Gothenburg. However, the first team 
awaited a medical team (which was not requested from MRCC), delaying their departure 
from Berga until 04.28 hrs. 
The second team from Stockholm was cancelled at 05.04 after they first had waited at Berga 
and later were flown to Huddinge Hospital to collect a medical team. 
The decision to await medical teams was taken by the helicopter Pilots without the SMC’s 
knowledge at MRCC. 
As mentioned, a considerable amount of helicopters were used in the mission: 8 Swedish, 3 
Danish and 2 Norwegian helicopters were alerted. Subsequently, 4 Swedish helicopters were 
cancelled, thus only 9 helicopters were actually used in the mission. 
The helicopters were mainly used to transport Fire Response Teams to amongst others, Stena 
Danica, seeing the PR was supposed incapable of receiving helicopters, as before mentioned. 
Four persons suffering from smoke-inhalation were transported by helicopter to Östra 
Hospital in Gothenburg. Some helicopters also transported passengers from Stena Danica to 
the assembly point at NCW, which was deemed unnecessary, since the passengers already 
were safe onboard the passenger ferry. This fact was also confirmed in several reports 
following the mission. 
The cause of fire has later been established as a combination of either a flexible hose on the 
fuel oil return pipe fracturing, alternatively failure in the connecting piece, and the fact that 
the oil hit a sufficiently warm surface causing ignition. 
The engine was originally designed with tailormade annealed steel return pipe from the fuel 
pumps. The original return pipes were later replaced by mass produced pipes which often 
had to be forced into place. This resulted in stress in the pipe which, combined with 
vibrations, resulted in fatigue fracture and leakage. When cracks were discovered in these 
pipes, they were replaced by mass produced reinforced flexible hoses. 
 
2.2.3 Human consequences  
1167 passengers and a crew of 172 were aboard the ferry; in total 1339 persons. One person 
suffered heart failure during the evacuation. She was resuscitated and transported to hospital 
where she later died. 13 other persons were taken care of by hospital staff, but none were 
seriously injured.  
 
2.2.4 Economic losses 
The economic consequences of fire on board vessels is estimated to approximately 130 
thousand Euro per minute.  
The total amount of SAR units engaged in the mission were the following: 
- SSRS: Rescue-boats Märta Collin, Po Hansson, Ulla Rinman, Dan Broström and Lars 
Prytz. 
- Swedish Maritime Administration: Pilot-boats nos. 739, 735, 556 and 742. 
- Swedish Coastguard: Coastguard vessels nos. 288, 447, 483 and 050. 
- Swedish Military Forces: 3 Combat-boats (model Stridsbåt 90), 1 “Trossboat” and 1 
minesweeper. 
- Styrsö Ferryboat Company: “Älvsnabben” nos. 4 and 5. 
- Rescue-boat Göte 
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- Danish Rescue-boat Samsö 
- Tanker ms Tell 
- Passenger-ferry ms Stena Danica 
- Chemical-tanker ms Kihlstraum 
- Passenger-ferry ms Black Watch 
- Fishing-vessel Matilda 
- Tanker ms Futura 
- 8 Swedish helicopters, whereof 4 subsequently cancelled. 
- 5 foreign helicopters (2 Norwegian and 3 Danish) 
- Fire Response Teams from Sweden (Gothenburg, Helsingborg and Stockholm), from - 
Denmark (Fredrikshamn) and from Norway (Larvik). 
 
2.2.5 Prevention measures and related lessons learnt 
The shipowners are responsible for fire prevention on board the vessel. This includes 
necessary equipment for the crew and passengers should fire occur, and essential training 
and drills for the crew. 
Lessons learnt 
þ The two main engines on board Prinsesse Ragnhild had a common feed pump for 
fuel. The engine which had caught fire was stopped immediately, but the other was 
left to run. This resulted in the continued pumping of fuel oil from the damaged hose. 
In addition, there was a common fuel pipe from the day tank to the auxiliary engine. 
The consequences of this situation would suggest that separate fuel injection to each 
main engine and groups of auxiliary engines should be introduced. The feed pump for 
each main engine/group of auxiliary engines must shut off automatically when 
emergency shut-down is undertaken. When pressure drops in the fuel supply system 
the alarm must be sounded. The automatic start up of “stand by” feed pump according 
to present day requirements should be reconsidered.  
þ Thermal oil systems should not be permitted in new passenger vessels unless the fire 
risk analysis shows that this is a safe solution.  
þ Steel pipes should be used for both fuel supply and return pipes. All fuel pipes must 
be fitted in such a way that they are not put into tension during installation. If flexible 
hoses are absolutely necessary in low pressure pipes, they should be type-approved 
and installed as double hoses.  
þ Subsequent investigations have shown that on most equivalent engines, areas are to be 
found which attain over 2200C despite the fact that the engines are isolated. In the 
future, isolation of warm surfaces in new engines should form part of the criteria for 
type-approval.  
þ Following the fire on board Prinsesse Ragnhild, Norway has chosen to expedite the 
requirement for a local extinguishing system in engine rooms. At international level 
the requirement for local extinguishing systems in engine rooms (fixed-water local 
application fire fighting system for use is category A machinery spaces) comes into 
force 1 July 2002 pursuant to revised SOLAS 2000. The requirement will be 
applicable to vessels with an engine room size of more than 500 m3. This requirement 
was introduced for Norwegian passenger vessels in international service with effect 
from 1 January 2001, and from 1 July 2001 for vessels in national service.  
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þ As written above, the economic consequences of fire on board vessels is estimated to 
approximately 130 thousand Euro per minute. As the cost of a local extinguishing 
system is the equivalent of 1 minute’s fire on board, it is advantageous to make such 
an investment. Furthermore, the average time for the CO2 system to trigger off in 
connection with fire in engine rooms is 20-30 minutes from the outbreak of fire. 63 % 
of fires on board vessels break out in the engine room.  
 
2.2.6 Preparedness measures and related lessons learnt 
Shipowners who operate vessels in fixed or regular routes must have emergency contingency 
plans for company and vessel drawn up in agreement with the national rescue services in the 
countries involved. The vessel’s emergency plans shall safeguard passengers, crew, the 
environment and cargo, and contribute to reducing the extent of any possible damage. 
 
The vessel’s crew must be capable of extinguishing any conceivable fire in an efficient 
manner. Land-based assistance must only be regarded as a supplimentary resource which 
may be recruited. In 1993, Norwegian Municipal Fire Services were given a general 
instruction to render assistance in cases of fire and other accident situations in sea areas in or 
outside the territorial water limits. 
Lessons learnt 
þ Naturally, the transportation of fire fighters from land to vessel takes time. The fire on 
Prinsesse Ragnhild stresses the need on board for sufficient equipment and 
competence. Land-based fire fighters shall be regarded as welcome assistance in 
attaining optimal effect over a comparatively long period of time. In addition, any 
likely positive psychological effects on crew members comes into consideration. The 
fire was already extinguished on Prinsesse Ragnhild when the land-based fire fighters 
were ready to contribute. They were therefore engaged to cool down heated areas and 
undertake post-fire extinguishing where necessary. 
 
2.2.7 Response actions and related lessons learnt 
When fire occurs on passenger vessels it is essential that people vacate their cabins quickly 
and arrive at assembly stations for evacuation. The evacuation of passengers on Prinsesse 
Ragnhild was successful. Limited smoke came into passenger quarters and the situation 
could have been more difficult if there had been greater amounts. Traditional smoke diving 
equipment is intended for fire fighting personnel and is not well suited for crew members 
whose duty is to assist passengers. 
Good internal communication from the crew to passengers over the PA (Public Address)-
system is essential. One of the communication centres in the engine room was not 
functioning during the fire. This made communication more difficult during fire fighting. 
The decision to evacuate passengers was taken, but continued fire fighting was necessary. 
The instruction to evacuate was therefore given over the megaphone to ensure that fire 
fighting crew remained behind. 
Lessons learnt 
þ Crew members who are to assist passengers in an emergency situation must wear 
distinctive markers to ensure complete understanding as to who is responsible. They 
should also be equipped with suitable breathing equipment. 
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þ Traditional life jackets proved to be difficult to work with for the crew during the 
incident, even though they fulfilled regulation requirements. 
þ The number of childrens’ life jackets on Prinsesse Ragnhild was insufficient. 
Requirements in regulations that at least 10% of life jackets on board should be for 
children was, however, met with. Infants’ life jackets were not available (this is not 
presently a mandatory requirement.) During the next two years Norway will, 
however, be engaged in promoting such a requirement for IMO (International 
Maritime Organization).  
þ The PA system and internal UHF (Ultra High Frequency) system should be 
duplicated and separated in such a manner that total communication with crew and 
passengers in all parts of the ship is maintained during and following fires or when 
taking in water.  All systems should be connected to UPS (Uninterrupted Power 
Supply). 
þ Preparations should be made for the introduction of alternative channels of 
communication in the event of emergencies, and training in the use of these systems. 
Crew members who work in noisy surroundings, or work with their hands, must be 
issued with hands-free communication equipment. 
þ The possibility of constructing and placing a PA system which functions better, and 
which can be heard over the back ground noise of evacuation situations, should be 
looked into.  
 
2.2.8 Information supplied to the public and related lessons learnt 
 
Prior to the event 
Following the fire on board Scandinavian Star in 1990, heavy focus was held on fire 
prevention measures on board passenger ferries. Municipal Fire Services are under general 
instruction to render assistance in cases of fire and other accident situations in sea areas in or 
outside Norwegian territorial water limits. 
 
During the event 
Two press releases were issued containing general and objective information on the incident. 
 
Following the event  
An enquiry commission consisting of experts appointed by the Norwegian Director General 
of Shipping and Navigation investigated the incident. The report is available from the 
Norwegian Maritime Directorate. 
The Swedish Directorate of Shipping and Navigation has also issued a report on this 
incident. The report may be obtained from the Swedish directorate. 
 
2.2.9 Recommendations to be considered in new routines within the Swedish Maritime 
Organisation 
The Swedish Investigation, evaluation and experience of SAR case no. 529, the fire onboard 
the passenger ferry m/s Prinsesse Ragnhild, resultrd in the following 28 recommendations: 
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Recommendations regarding the management and staff-methodology at MRCC 
Gothenburg 
þ The competence and possibilities of co-operation within the LCK9 as a whole, as well 
as the separate functions individually should be further looked into.  
þ Staff-exercises with the purpose of training and improving staff-methodology and to 
create routines for forming working-teams. (In accordance with the CT decision 1/98)  
þ All SMC’s (Sar Mission Co-ordinator) shall be trained in handling major SAR-
missions and, if necessary, made aware of the specific issues concerning missions of 
this magnitude.  
Recommendations concerning the MRSC-function 
þ Routines shall be established so that the MRSC-function can be activated in the best 
possible way in major SAR-missions. The MRSC is a part of the MRCC staff and 
shall be utilised efficiently. 
This recommendation should be co-ordinated with the recommendations concerning the 
MRCC. 
Recommendations concerning observations from Norway and Denmark 
þ In international SAR-exercises or exercises of an international character, the English 
language shall be used.  
þ The issue of satisfactory communication-equipment for Fire Response Teams shall be 
discussed further within the Fire Response Team Co-ordination Group. (See 
recommendations concerning Fire Response Team) 
Recommendations concerning communication 
þ In major SAR-missions where a large amount of SRUs (Search and Rescue Units) 
and an OSC (On-Scene Commander) are involved as well as in major SAR-exercises, 
the SMC shall, if required, designate a working frequency for communication 
between SRUs and OSC. 
þ The effects of distributing separate frequencies to air- and surface-units involved in 
SAR-missions should be further investigated and evaluated. 
þ Further recommendations concerning communication are listed under 
“Recommendations concerning Fire Response Teams” and “Recommendations 
concerning observations from Norway and Denmark”. 
Recommendations to improve the Support -Group function. 
þ Specific tasks and routines for the Support-Group are to be established in connection 
with the implementation of the recommendations concerning the MRCC and MRSC 
functions. 
                                                 
9 LCK – LedningsCentralen Kärringberget. The LCK is a combined co-ordination center consisting of 
four separate authorities, The MRCC (Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre), the ARCC (Aeronautical 
Rescue Co-ordination Centre), the Swedish Coastguard District West and the Military Sea-surveillance 
West. 
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Recommendations concerning guidelines for Captains/Shipping Companies in connection 
with SAR-missions.  
þ Guidelines specifying the Captains obligations and conditions of responsibility, when 
requested to participate in SAR-missions by MRCC, in accordance with the Ship 
Safety Act, The Maritime Law and the Swedish Rescue Services Act shall be 
established. The guidelines shall be worked out in co-operation with the Maritime 
Inspection, the Legal Department and the Maritime Traffic Department of the 
Swedish Maritime Administration. 
Recommendations concerning Fire Response Teams. 
þ The SMC at MRCC is to decide which resources are to accompany the helicopters 
used in a SAR-mission. (According to the agreement established between the 
Swedish Maritime Administration and the Swedish Military Forces.) The helicopter-
crew shall not take onboard and transport any additional personnel besides the crew 
without prior consultation and clearance from the SMC Sar Mission Co-ordinator). 
þ In case uncertainty arises as to who is to decide where to tow a disabled vessel during 
the course of a SAR-mission, procedures should be drawn up stating channels of 
contact and responsibilities of decision between the Shipping Company, the Maritime 
Inspection, the SMC and Port Authorities. 
þ In one mission-report the question of neighbouring countries Fire Response Teams 
organisation is mentioned. 
At a NORDRED10 conference in Kuopio, Finland in 1996, the issue of a Nordic Fire 
Response Team collaboration was discussed within a working-group, which resulted 
in recommendations for the continuation of this co-operation. The issue has also been 
discussed in the Swedish Fire Response Team Co-ordination Group. The Swedish 
Rescue-Service Administration has been suggested to bring up the issue with our 
neighbouring countries within NORDRED to further develop methodology and 
instructions. 
þ The proximity of a Fire Response Team station and/or of a helicopter base with SAR-
readiness should be taken into consideration, when deciding on the use of a Fire 
Response Team in a SAR-mission. In the case of m/s Prinsesse Ragnhild it took 2 
hours and 20 minutes before the Fire Response Team was onboard the disabled 
vessel, despite the nearness to both a Fire Response Team station and a helicopter 
base with SAR-readiness, which must be considered remarkable. This fact requires 
further attention and investigation.  
þ In the instructions for the Fire Response Teams, established in co-operation between 
all Fire Response Team stations, means of communication and frequencies have been 
designated for the purpose of communication between Teams. As the communication 
failed in this SAR-mission this issue should be further discussed within the Swedish 
Fire Response Team Co-ordination Group.  
þ There must be no question for the Fire Response Team on the purpose of the mission 
or on where the responsibility of the mission lies. In this case there was uncertainty 
over whether the Fire Response Teams were involved in life-saving or salvage of 
property. If the primary task is to save lives, it must be clearly notified by the SMC 
                                                 
10 NORDRED – A Scandinavian Committee of experts involved in Rescue Services in general. 
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when this task is considered to be over. Information/instructions regarding this aspect 
shall be established for the SMC as well as for the Fire Response Teams. 
Recommendations concerning the OSC function 
þ The co-operation between the SMC (Sar Mission Co-ordinator) and the OSC (On-
Scene Commander)-Pilots shall be subject to further practice and improved to 
eliminate misunderstandings on the responsibilities and tasks of the parties when an 
OSC is involved in a SAR-mission. 
þ The OSC-Pilots shall be informed, instructed and trained in co-operating with an 
ACO-function. 
þ The OSC-Pilots should be informed on the importance of choosing the most suitable 
SRU to be used as “platform” for the OSC-function.  
Recommendations on the use of helicopters involved in SAR-missions. 
þ Helicopter-crews, the medical organisations and responsible authorities shall be 
informed of the fact that it is the SMC, in accordance with the Swedish Rescue 
Services Act, who decides which personnel and equipment is to be taken in the 
helicopters used in a SAR-mission. (See recommendations concerning Fire Response 
Team). 
þ The ACO (Aircraft Co-ordinator )-function shall be improved and the co-operation 
between SMC, ACO and OSC practised. 
þ Helicopters engaged in a SAR-mission, but without a specific task, shall not be 
airborne on the scene, but should rather, when practically possible, be landed in the 
vicinity. Information/instructions regarding this matter should be established within 
the improvement of the ACO-function. 
Recommendations concerning the Assembly Point 
þ Considering the problems encountered with identification and keeping count of the 
passengers involved in major SAR-missions, the SMC should, as far as possible, 
avoid establishing more than one assembly point. 
Recommendation regarding media-relations in SAR-missions 
þ Routines for media-relations in connection with SAR-missions are to be established 
by the Department of Public Relations at the Swedish Maritime Administration.  
Recommendation regarding the choice of berth for a hazardous disabled-vessel 
þ In major SAR-exercises this aspect should be considered and practised.  
þ Contacts with other ports in the area should be made at an early stage.  
Recommendation concerning medical assistance in SAR-missions 
þ Plain instructions shall be made out for the SMC, the Medical Authorities and other 
authorities and organisations involved in SAR-organisation, regarding the 
participation of medical teams in SAR-missions. It should furthermore be controlled 
that these directives are subsequently followed. 
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2.3 The Ulsund-LHNW Disaster (Norway, Finland)  
Finn Paulsrud (Maritime Investigator, Norway), Martti Heikkilä, (Accident Investigation 
Board, Finland), Risto Repo (Accident Investigation Board, Finland) and Jerker Klaweri 
(Finnish Maritime Administration, Finland) 
This contribution is based on the Joint Norwegian/Finnish Marine Casualty Report (May 
2001) downloaded from http://www.onnettomuustutkinta.fi/10889.htm. 
 
2.3.1 Date of the disaster and location 
27 February 1998, in the waters off Lista, Norway. 
 
2.3.2 Description of the event 
The Ulsund (see Fig 2.3.a) loaded 2,404 metric tons of aluminium in St. Petersburg, Russia 
in the period from 14 February to 17 February 1998. The ship sailed from St. Petersburg on 
17 February 1998 at 19.15 hrs, heading for Høyanger, Norway. There was ice in the 
innermost part of the Bay of Finland and the ship had to wait for about two and a half days 
for icebreaker assistance. The ship arrived at Copenhagen in the morning of 25 February 
1998 after being slightly delayed in the Baltic Sea due to bad weather. The captain was 
replaced in Copenhagen. The cargo and the excavator were checked and found to be in order 
and bunker oil, fresh water and provisions were brought on board. 
 
Figure 2.3.a – The MV Ulsund. 
© Accident Investigation Board Finland 
In the afternoon of 25 February 1998, the voyage to Høyanger continued. In the Skagerrak, 
the ship encountered SW/W winds, varying between near gale and gale, and heavy sea, 5 to 
6 m. The ship’s speed was reduced to 3 to 4 knots. The master called the shipping company 
in Finland both on 26 February and on 27 February 1998 without giving any information 
about problems related to the seaworthiness of the ship. On 27 February 1998 at 21.25 hrs 
the ship transmitted the distress alert MAYDAY on VHF radio channel 16 from the position 
N 57.00-57.80 and E 06.00-12.60 (see Figure 2.3.b) Farsund Radio answered the ship 
immediately and after roughly 70 seconds the captain told them that: 
a) the ship made water, 
b) its port bulwark and deck were submerged, 
c) it listed approx. 6 degrees (to port), 
d) they were trying to pump, 
e) they needed immediate assistance, 
f) there were 7 people on board. 
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It is assumed that the ship went down in the course of about 10 to 15 minutes, as no other 
vessel observed any clear radar echo in the indicated casualty position. The first vessel 
reached the indicated casualty position about one hour later, at which time there was only 
wreckage left. 
 
 
Figure 2.3.b – Last position of MV Ulsund. 
© Accident Investigation Board Finland 
 
2.3.3 Human consequences 
7 people (entire crew) lost their lives in this disaster. 
 
2.3.4 Economic losses 
Not available. 
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2.3.5 General findings and related lessons learnt 
Related to the excavator and transverse beam 
In accordance with the test certificate for excavator/traverse beam, the placement of 
equipment when the ship was underway was as that during voyage the transverse beam 
should be parked on aft end of cargo hatch and locked” . 
According to information from ship owner Trond Kittilsen, the excavator/traverse beam 
could either be secured at the front end of the wheelhouse or at the aft end of the forecastle. 
There were two steel brackets for securing the traverse beam at the front end of the 
wheelhouse, where these steel brackets were welded to the starboard and port rails of the 
hatch covers. Similarly, two steel brackets for securing the traverse beam at the aft end of the 
forecastle were welded to the starboard and port rails of the hatch covers. In each of these 
four steel brackets, there was a hole, enabling one to lock the traverse beam by inserting a 
steel bolt with a diameter of 100 millimetres. 
Video recordings of the Ulsund wreck in the summer of 1999 show that none of the steel 
brackets on the rails where the traverse beam could be locked with steel bolts were 
deformed/damaged, neither those at the aft end of the loading hatch nor those in front. Since 
none of the four steel brackets, which are arranged and devised for fastening the traverse 
beam, have been deformed/damaged, this proves that the excavator/traverse beam cannot 
have been parked and locked as was required of the equipment, i.e. “parked on aft end of 
cargo hatch and locked”. 
þ It is necessary that investigators address to all parties concerned, i.e. dockyards, 
planners, shipowners, operators, masters and classification societies that, the excavator 
and its traverse and other heavy cargo-handling equipment must be arranged and 
secured as indicated in documents for such equipment when the vessel is under way. 
Related to water ingress and leakages 
When questioned, some of the crews that sailed on the ship in the autumn of 1997 and the 
winter of 1998 explained that on some occasions water had leaked into the hold and the 
double bottom tanks. 
In his distress signal made at 21.25 hrs on 27 February 1998, the ship’s captain stated that: 
· The ship was making water, without stating where. 
· Attempts were made at pumping, without stating from where. 
· The ship’s port-side railings and deck were under water, and the vessel had a six 
degree list. 
· The ship disappeared from the surface of the sea in a short space of time, an estimated 
10–15 minutes. 
On the basis of the above distress signal, and the brief period of time before the ship 
disappeared from the surface of the sea, the ship must have taken in large amounts of water 
within a relatively short period of time. It is highly probable that water has leaked into the 
hold. No other tanks or containers have a volume large enough to cause the ship to sink by 
the leaking of water in such as short space of time. Since the ship had a list and the deck was 
under water, the ship’s stability was reduced dramatically. 
The cause of the water penetration is unknown, there are two matters that may have led to 
this, i.e.: 
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1. Due to the bad weather, the excavator/traverse beam, weighing a total of approx. 45 
tonnes, may have come loose and damaged, or even removed, the hatch covers with, 
for example, the excavator arm or the grab. In the bad weather, with W-NW winds of 
30 knots and a significant wave height of 5-6 m, vast amounts of seawater may have 
entered the hold. 
From video recordings of the wreck in the summer of 1999, it may be concluded that 
the excavator/traverse beam was not locked as described in the certificate for the 
above-mentioned equipment, i.e. that the traverse beam was not locked by inserting 
steel bolts into the brackets at the aft end of the loading hatch, since none of the steel 
brackets were deformed or damaged. 
The steel brackets at the front end of the loading hatch are not deformed or damaged, 
which would indicate that the excavator/traverse beam was not locked to the aft end of 
the forecastle either. 
However, there are remains of the mooring lines and wire approximately amidships on 
the main deck, perhaps indicating that the crew could have used this to fasten 
“something”. It is natural to believe that mooring line and wire have been used to 
lash/lock the excavator/traverse beam, which has stood in a position approximately 
midway over the loading hatch, most likely with the grab resting on the hatch cover. 
2. The crew members who sailed on the ship in the autumn of 1997 and the winter of 
1998 have stated of the occasional leaking of water into the double bottom tanks and 
occasionally into the hold. Such leaks could also have occurred on the casualty 
voyage, which has meant that the ship had little freeboard, and would thus be 
subjected to enormous stress on its hull, particularly on the bow. In the bad weather, 
with a significant wave height of 5-6 m, cracks may have formed in the bow section, 
resulting in large amounts of water leaking into, among other things, the hold, thus 
causing the casualty. 
þ It is important that investigators deal seriously with water ingress and leakages. If there 
is water ingress in a vessel, for instance to tanks or holds, such problems must be 
resolved before the ship puts out to sea. 
 
2.3.6 Information supply to the public and related lessons learnt 
 
Not available. 
 
 
2.4 The Lea and Nipsu Disaster 
Risto Repo (Accident Investigation Board Finland, Helsinki) 
 
2.4.1 Date of the disaster and location 
12 April 1999, in the waters of the southern Bay of Bothnia. 
 
2.4.2 Description of the event 
Baltic herring trawlers Lea and Nipsu were trawling in the southern Bay of Bothnia. The 
fishermen did not arrive to their port at the time they had reported. The search and rescue on 
the next morning resulted in the finding the trawler, Nipsu but not Lea.It was at sea in full 
condition, with the engine running and lights on but nobody onboard. The vessels had been 
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working as pair trawlers, both manned with one fisherman. It is a practice to leave the other 
vessel drifting and then the other fisherman moves to the vessel, which will take the catch. It 
was obvious that the other trawler had sunk. 
Investigation showed that the accident occurred when hoisting the load of fish onboard. The 
vessel lost it’s stability, listed and caught water on deck in stern area. This resulted in 
increasing loss of stability and the vessel sunk rapidly. 
 
2.4.3 Human consequences 
There were two deaths (one from each trawler). In June 1999 local fishermen organised a 
search and found a wreck which was later identified to be the missing trawler LEA. 
Later in summer 1999 the other fisherman was found dead in water in the archipelago of 
Kristiinankaupunki. The other fisherman has not been found. 
 
2.4.4 Economic losses 
Not available. 
 
2.4.5 General findings and related lessons learnt 
þ It is essential that for the smaller fishing craft, which have been built without drawings 
and stability calculations should dealt with in a special manner, i.e. these stability 
criteria should be evaluated with practical tests and there should be a nomination of the 
maximum load of fish to be hoisted per heave. 
þ Education and training should be provided (practical with examples and theoretical) 
for the masters of fishing vessels. 
þ The maritime authorities should demand the necessary stability information also from 
the smaller fishing vessels, and also a load line or maximum cargo (fish) amount 
should be established for each individual fishing vessel. This is possible within 
existing legislation framework in Finland. 
þ The effect on safety of fishing depends strongly on the fishing method and on the 
quality and condition of the fishing gear. Therefore it is important that these should 
also be checked during the inspections by the authority. 
þ It is important to wear suitable life jackets, which do keep an unconscious person in 
upright position. 
þ The assisting vessel should be manned all times. 
þ Fishing vessels should have automatically releasing life rafts with a drift anchor. 
 
2.4.6 Information supply to the public and related lessons learnt 
Not available. 
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3 RECAP OF LESSONS LEARNT 
Ana Lisa Vetere Arellano 
(EC, Joint Research Centre, Ispra) 
The contributions in this report document that maritime disasters are also quite common in 
Europe (see Annex A for other examples of maritime disasters) and that their causes vary 
(see Annex A for the possible causes). 
 
It is obvious that lessons learnt from maritime disasters is accident specific. Each disaster 
will have its characteristics and, depending on the country in which the disaster has occurred, 
it will also have a different disaster management scheme. This chapter aims to summarise 
general lessons learnt that have been retrieved from the four maritime disasters described in 
this report, which have been grouped according to the disaster management phase 
(prevention, preparedness and response). Furthermore, where relevant, the lessons learnt 
have been grouped into the following areas: 
· Regarding regulation 
· Regarding coordination 
· Regarding inspectors 
· Regarding training 
· Regarding equipment and maritime vessel 
· Regarding communication. 
Lastly, lessons learnt regarding the dissemination of information are also summarised. 
It is important to bear in mind that the lessons learnt are not ordered according to their 
importance, but mainly according to “logical” considerations. 
 
3.1 Lessons learnt concerning prevention measures 
 
Regarding regulation 
þ The SOLAS requirements should always be satisfied.  
þ Design procedures for bow doors should be continuously improved, in line with new 
technologies. 
þ Guidelines specifying the Captains obligations and conditions of responsibility, when 
requested to participate in SAR-missions should be established, in accordance with 
any existing legislation. The guidelines shall be worked out in co-operation with all 
competent authorities.  
þ The ship owners should be made responsible for fire prevention on board the vessel.  
þ The maritime authorities should demand the necessary stability information also from 
the smaller fishing vessels.  
þ A load line or maximum cargo (fish) amount should be established for each individual 
fishing vessel.  
Regarding investigators 
þ It is necessary that investigators address to all parties concerned, i.e. dockyards, 
planners, ship owners, operators, masters and classification societies that all heavy 
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cargo-handling equipment must be arranged and secured as indicated in documents for 
such equipment when the vessel is under way.  
þ It is important that investigators deal seriously with water ingress and leakages. If there 
is water ingress in a vessel, for instance to tanks or holds, such problems must be 
resolved before the ship puts out to sea.  
þ The effect on safety of fishing depends strongly on the fishing method and on the 
quality and condition of the fishing gear. Therefore it is important that these should 
also be checked during the inspections by the authority.  
Regarding equipment and maritime vessel  
þ When a fire occurs, it is necessary that adequate equipment for the crew and 
passengers are readily available.  
þ It is important to wear suitable life jackets, which do keep an unconscious person in 
upright position.  
þ Fishing vessels should have automatically releasing life rafts with a drift anchor.  
Regarding training 
þ Essential training and drills for the crew must be promoted and ensured.  
 
 
3.2 Lessons learnt concerning preparedness measures 
 
Regarding coordination 
þ The competence and possibilities of co-operation within the coordination centre as a 
whole, as well as the separate and individual functions should be further looked into 
and well identified and established.  
Regarding training 
þ The crew should have been better prepared for crisis situations, in order to react more 
efficiently. 
þ Evacuation manoeuvres should be regularly practiced and carried out during crisis 
situations. 
þ Staff-exercises with the purpose of training and improving staff-methodology and to 
create routines for forming working-teams should be promoted.  
þ All SMC’s (SAR Mission Co-ordinator) shall be trained in handling major SAR-
missions and, if necessary, made aware of the specific issues concerning missions of 
this magnitude.  
Regarding equipment and maritime vessel  
þ There is a need for sufficient on board equipment and competence at all times.  
Regarding communication 
þ In international SAR-exercises or exercises of an international character, the English 
language shall be used.  
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3.3 Lessons learnt concerning response measures 
 
Regarding coordination 
þ The coordination of the response operations should be improved, as it is necessary to 
respond timely to the disaster.  
þ It is necessary to establish which resources are to accompany the helicopters used in a 
SAR-mission.  
þ The helicopter-crew shall not take onboard and transport any additional personnel 
besides the crew without prior consultation and clearance from the SMC (SAR 
Mission Co-ordinator).  
þ In case uncertainty arises as to who is to decide where to tow a disabled vessel during 
the course of a SAR-mission, procedures should be drawn up stating channels of 
contact and responsibilities of decision between the Shipping Company, the Maritime 
Inspection, the SMC and Port Authorities.  
þ The proximity of a Fire Response Team station and/or of a helicopter base with SAR-
readiness should be taken into consideration, when deciding on the use of a Fire 
Response Team in a SAR-mission.  
þ The purpose of the mission and where the responsibility of the mission lies must 
always be clear to all stakeholders. This way, e.g. there will be no uncertainty over 
which Fire Response Teams are in charge of life saving and those responsible for 
salvaging of property. If the primary task is to save lives, the SMC must be clearly 
notified when this task is considered to be over. Information/instructions regarding this 
aspect should be established for the SMC as well as for the Fire Response Teams.  
þ Helicopters engaged in a SAR-mission, but without a specific task, shall not be 
airborne on the scene, but should rather, when practically possible, be landed in the 
vicinity.  
þ Considering the problems encountered with identification and keeping count of the 
passengers involved in major SAR-missions, the SMC should, as far as possible, avoid 
establishing more than one assembly point.  
þ Contacts with other ports in the area should be made at an early stage.  
þ Plain instructions shall be made out for the SMC, the Medical Authorities and other 
authorities and organisations involved in SAR-organisation, regarding the participation 
of medical teams in SAR-missions. It should furthermore be controlled that these be 
followed.  
Regarding equipment and maritime vessel  
þ The helicopters had a key part in the rescue operation by rescuing most of the people 
who had succeeded in climbing onto life rafts or lifeboats. However they should be 
better organised.  
þ The lifesaving equipment of vessels participating in rescue operations should be made 
suitable for rescuing people from the water during heavy weather conditions.  
Regarding communication 
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þ Instructions regarding distress traffic given by any coordination centre should be 
clearer and more precise.  
þ In major SAR-missions where a large amount of SRUs (Search and Rescue Units) and 
an OSC (On-Scene Commander) are involved as well as in major SAR-exercises, the 
SMC (SAR Mission Co-ordinator) shall, if required, designate a working frequency 
for communication between SRUs and OSC.  
þ It is important that the means of communication and frequencies have to be better 
designated for the purpose of communication between the Fire Response Teams.  
þ The effects of distributing separate frequencies to air- and surface-units involved in 
SAR-missions should be further investigated and evaluated.  
 
 
3.4 Lessons learnt concerning dissemination of information to the public 
 
þ Passengers should be given targeted information so that they can be prepared for a 
crisis situation. Information given to passengers during a disaster should be clear and 
in simple language. 
þ Alarm should be timely and efficient.  
þ Routines for media-relations in connection with SAR-missions are to be established by 
the public relations department within the designated competent authority.  
 
 
3.5 Closing considerations 
 
International investigation into marine accidents has shown that some 80% of all maritime 
mishaps, accidents and disasters are caused by human failure or even crew's negligence11. 
Results of another study, which analysed total loss accidents for 15 countries with sample 
sizes of 500 and 1,500 ships of over 500grt12 (Gross Register Tonne), over a period of 25 
years, the first leading circumstances of maritime casualties in the merchant fleet for both 
sample sizes were in the following order: stranding; fire; water leaks; gales; and collisions.  
In order to cope with such accidents, it is essential to put safety top on the priority list of all 
stakeholders dealing with maritime disaster management. Ship safety, and thus, the safety of 
its passengers, crew and cargo, are determined by internal and external factors, but most of 
all by human factors. Examples of these factors are given in Table 3.5.a. 
 
Table 3.5.a – Examples of internal, external  anf human factors that determine safety in navigation. 
Internal Factors External Factors Human Factors 
Ship characteristics: weight, 
geometry, etc. 
Weather: foggy, severe storm, etc. Degree of training of 
captain and crew 
Ship accessories: rudder, 
navigational instruments, etc. 
Water body characteristics: wave 
amplitude, currents, etc. 
Awareness information 
disseminated to passengers  
                                                 
11 Source: http://home.planet.nl/~kluijven/safety.html 
12 The grt of a ship is a measurement of the total capacity of the ship and is not a measure of weight. 
Net register tonnage = (grt) – (space used for accommodation, machinery, engine area and fuel storage) 
This is how the cargo-carrying ability of a ship is calculated. 
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This fact has clearly been echoed by the four maritime accidents portrayed in ths report. The 
safety of the vessel and its passengers was put at risk due to human factors and a mixture of 
internal and external factors. External factors cannot be controlled. They can only be 
monitored by internal and human factors. Thus, it is of great importance to raise awareness 
of the need to efficiently control these two factors. 
The international treaty that has been catered to address the issue of controlling internal and 
human factors with regards to navigation safety, in a guided and concerted manner, is the 
SOLAS Convention. The main objective of the SOLAS Convention is to specify minimum 
standards for the construction, equipment and operation of ships, compatible with their 
safety. Safety can be achieved by efficient shipbuilding, fire-resistant bulkheads, life-saving 
appliances and facilities, radio communications, regulations regarding grain in bulk and 
dangerous goods transportation. SOLAS also enforces sea-time training on board merchant 
vessels, along with fire and abandon-ship drills. 
As technology progresses and mankind increases its knowledge in maritime disaster 
managment, it is crucial that the SOLAS Convention evolves in simbiosis with technology 
advancement. Captain and crew should be well trained in the use of new navigational and 
communication instruments and passengers should always be updated with the latest 
preparedness information regarding maritime safety. Furthermore, it is fundamental that 
lessons learnt reports, such as this one, are fed back into the SOLAS mechanism, triggering 
amendments where required. Lessons learnt reports should also be catered to target all 
stakeholders and disseminated to as many people as possible. This would lead to increasing 
awareness at all levels. This way, mankind will succeed in its endeavour to guarantee the 
safety of life at sea. 
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Annex 
Possible causes of maritime disasters  
and interesting links on maritime-related issues 
 
 
 
Table A1 - Possible causes of maritime disasters 
Bad weather 
Collission (with marine animal, e.g. whale; an object, e.g. vessel, reef) 
Flammable cargo 
Ice 
Inadequate maintenance 
Inexperienced crew 
Leakage 
Malfunctioning of communications equipment 
Miscommunication (intership, intra-ship and between vessels and Vessel Traffic 
Service-stations) 
Overloading of vessel 
Piracy 
Violation of existing regulation 
War 
 
 
 
Table A2 - Interesting links on maritime-related issues 
· International Maritime Organization 
http://www.imo.org/index.htm 
· Accident Investigation Board FINLAND 
http://www.onnettomuustutkinta.fi/2606.htm 
· Swedish Board of Accident Investigation 
http://www.havkom.se/english.phtml 
· International Maritime Fire and Rescue Information 
http://www.fire.org.uk/marine/ 
· International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 
http://www.imo.org/Conventions/contents.asp?topic_id=257&doc_id=647 
· International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) 
· http://www.iacs.org.uk/index1.htm 
· Tritec Marine Cosultants 
http://www.tritec-marine.co.uk/splash.asp 
· Fisher Maritime Analytical Naval Architects 
http://www.fishermaritime.com/ 
· Lost Liners: Earth’s once great ships 
· http://library.thinkquest.org/17297/index2.htm 
· Missing. Lost and wrecked ships of the world 
http://www.greatdreams.com/ships.htm 
 
